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1.  Introduction 
With its first contested democratic elections, since 1990, on 8 November 2015, the 
Republic of the Union of Myanmar is undergoing a rapid process of democratization. 
With a voter turnout of around 80 % of those eligible to vote (BBC, 2015), it was per-
ceived as a historic elections on the road to democracy. 
In the aftermath of the elections, observers reported only few irregularities regarding 
the voting process and deemed the final result, which put the National League for 
Democracy1 (NLD) into government, to be legitimate. Despite the elections being 
regarded as a success, criticism of exclusion of certain minority groups and a military 
dominance in parliament were widely reported in international media. One of the 
groups, central to this claim of criticism, is the Muslim Rohingya minority situated in 
the South Western part of Myanmar, the Rakhine State. Not new to this sort of dis-
crimination, the Rohingya saw their voting rights removed and their representation in 
government diminished in the run up to the 2015 elections (McPherson, 2015). How-
ever these events merely served as latest step in the Rohingya’s history of alienation 
from the Burmese state and society.  
 
1.1 Problem area 
In fact the Muslim minorities, especially the Rohingya, have experienced significant 
marginalization since the transition to a democratizing system in 2008 (Holliday, 
2008). This marginalization has existed generations before the democratic process 
was put into motion, but it has experienced a significant surge in the new atmos-
phere of democratization and liberalization, creating a visible divide between the 
Buddhist majority and the Muslim minority (Holliday, 2014). 
The recent election only seemed to further this divide, with the topic of the Rohingya 
being one of extreme sensitivity, resulting in a remarkable political silence on the 
topic, even from Burmese leaders such as the Nobel Peace Prize winner and demo-
cratic hope Aung San Suu Kyi2 (BBC, 2015). The lack of attention to minority groups 
is not only a result of the sensitivity of the subject, but that the failure of minority in-
clusion is directly linked to the nature of democracy in Myanmar. 
                                               
1
 called NLD in the further study 
2
 called Suu Kyi in the further study 
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While the transition from an oppressive military Junta to a more democratic system 
has successfully allowed an opposition into parliament, the maintenance of the mili-
tary as a political force with constitutional protection has drawn attention to the legit-
imacy of the Burmese democratic system. 
  
Despite the democratic progress seen in Myanmar there seems to be little hope of 
betterment for the Rohingya (BBC, 2015). It seems paradoxically that democracy is 
generally regarded as the most virtues and fair way to govern in the Global North 
and a way to achieve national unity and equality. The case of Myanmar however 
presents a problem to this predisposed idea of democracy. In regards to this case 
we wish to examine the issues of ethnic violence and cohesion connected to the 
process of democratization with a focus on the marginalization of the Rohingya in 
Rakhine State during the democratization process from 2008 to 2015. 
 
1.2  Research Question 
Why has the democratization process in Myanmar marginalized the Rohingya mi-
nority situated in Rakhine State? 
 
1.3  Hypothesis 
The general idea of this project is that the transformation to democracy brings about 
nationalistic tendencies, flourished and facilitated by influential groups, which often 
result in exclusion of minorities. 
We focus on how certain actors playing an active role in this matter have indirect or 
direct interests in hindering the democratization process. This results in them con-
sciously implementing policies that either directly or indirectly affect the marginaliza-
tion of minorities. In the case of this project, the groups in focus are on one side the 
groups and individuals profiting from the nationalistic practices, such as the parlia-
mentary engaged military and Rakhine Buddhists, and on the other side the Muslim 
Rohingya minority residing in Rakhine State. 
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We hypothesize that in the case of democratization in Myanmar, policies encourag-
ing marginalization legitimized through nationalism, have been implemented, in order 
to ensure that the elite maintains power and influence. 
With this in mind we argue that the focus on national cohesion brought on by the 
military and nationalist groups, justifies the existence of the army as a powerful insti-
tution in the decision-making process, which in turn affects the Rakhine State. Due to 
this argument, we hypothesize that this strategy is a key factor of increased margin-
alization of the Rohingya during the democratization process in Myanmar. 
 
1.4  Delimitations of research 
As the research question, mentioned above, solely focuses on the exclusion of one 
of the many minorities in Myanmar, the Rohingya, it limits our research and analysis 
to this certain perspective. However, we are aware that other existing minorities have 
been affected by the democratization process as well. Even though we have taking 
this fact into consideration, we have decided only to study the marginalization of the 
Rohingya due to the statement that they are one of the most persecuted minorities in 
the world (Unhcr.org, 2014; Hamling, 2015). Our case study can thus not be general-
ized in cases of democratization processes and its effects on minorities. 
Furthermore, the limited timeframe from 2008 until the present day, which this re-
search project is working with, restricts the research process concerning collection of 
data. We have found that to be able to get an understanding of the democratization 
process and the reasons for the country’s ethnic conflicts, we had to include material 
about the colonial-period and onwards. Though, our main focus throughout the anal-
ysis, the bearing part of our study, is kept on the mentioned timeframe. 
Setting this timeframe has certain benefits for our study, such as keeping the focus 
on the latest attempts of democratization itself, which in return will assist us in an-
swering the research question. On top of that, we are able to refer to the topicality of 
the problem by including the country's recent first democratic The anti-Rohingya sen-
timent within the Burmese population is one of the bearing reasons for the spreading 
nationalism that is spreading out during the democratization of Myanmar elections 
after 25 years (Human Rights Watch, 2015). 
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1.5 Literature Review 
The following will discuss the sources relevant for the topic chosen and presents the 
gap in the literature that we find necessary to explore. 
Firstly, we aim to shed light on the fact that democracy chiefly is viewed as a positive 
way of governing. This is a perspective generally encouraged by many countries in 
the Global North, NGOs and international organizations. In most cases this political 
system is said to be not only an effective way to govern, but also the most virtuous 
one that protects human rights (Taylor 2014, p. 290). 
However, the case of democratization in Myanmar examines that this type of system 
did not solely bring about positive effects to the country and it has therefore been 
widely discussed in literature. Thus, this literature was found essential to utilize in our 
analysis. 
In nascent democracies, where safety nets, consisting of strong national institutions, 
have not been established prior to the democratization process, ethnic conflicts are 
likely to emerge, as described in the theory about Nationalist Elite Persuasion in 
Democratizing States (Snyder, 2000). 
This is relevant when examining to the democratization process in Myanmar, since 
our research question calls to investigate the negative effects of this political transi-
tion, thus we consequently must draw on literature examining this paradox. We are 
aware that this theory has been contested, and that the author himself developed a 
new theory on the basis of the aforementioned. This however, put great focus on 
democratizing states being likely to engage in international wars, which is not appli-
cable to our case. 
Holliday uses the ladder theory to conclude that since no safety net was established 
in Myanmar, prior to the democratization process, violent conflicts arose. While argu-
ing for this conclusion, Holliday states that the military benefits from the spread of 
nationalism, which in turn leads to ethnic conflict. The military profits from the con-
flicts by restoring stability and imposing an idea of unity, only shared by the Buddhist 
part of the population. In turn this conflict ensures the military’s continued status as 
an elite and political force within Myanmar as it manages to gain support from the 
Buddhist part of the country. Thereafter the study argues that, in line with Snyder’s 
theory of Nationalist Elite Persuasion in Democratizing State, the elite, in this case 
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the military of Myanmar, approaches democratization dependent on their ability to 
maintain power. Thus both scholars use this theory to examine the causes of the 
exclusion of inner-country ethnic minorities from a more theoretical, political aspect. 
 
This topic has, however, also been explored from a more humanitarian point of view. 
Since our research question considers marginalisation of the Rohingya, it is evident 
to apply material examining this aspect, such as the watchdog platforms Al Jazeera, 
International Crisis Group, and Reuters. These platforms mainly investigate the Mus-
lim Rohingya in Rakhine State and provide evidence for their marginalization, 
through direct investigation in the involved society. Due to the fact that these interna-
tionally recognised, non-governmental organisations and news channels are not car-
rying out their research from the side-line but rather researched and investigated 
directly in the affected area, we have selected to use material from these although 
they are of a non-academic nature. Their inside-perspective and investigation of the 
humanitarian situation of the Rohingya also provide a greater insight into the situa-
tion. 
During the research process of this study, we have not found literary material that 
has combined the political and humanitarian aspect. This is the reason for us to 
combine both material that on the one side analyse the democratization process and 
its effects and on the other side literature investigating the marginalization of the 
Rohingya. Thus, this study fills out the gap in literature by explaining not only why 
democratization can have negative effects on minorities, but by specializing our case 
study on the marginalization of the Rohingya in Rakhine State. 
 
1.6  Clarification of terms  
While examining and analysing our researched material and literature, we have no-
ticed that different terms and definitions have been used to describe the same enti-
ties or circumstances. Thus there is a clear conflict of terms within the analysed liter-
ature, which is why we decided to clarify the usage of concepts in our study. 
 
The obvious conflict appearing in the literature found is between the employment of 
either Burma and Myanmar to address the name of the country. This is a result of 
the government's’ renaming of the country from Burma to Myanmar in 1989 
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(News.bbc.co.uk, 2007). We have decided to apply the term Myanmar, since this is 
the name officially used by the government. Furthermore, Burma is the name intro-
duced by a foreign government, the British, when they colonized the country. There-
fore, we agreed on addressing the country as Myanmar. However, some of our his-
torical background will address the country as Burma, but only when referring to the 
time before the official renaming of the country in 1989. 
 
A similar existing diversity appears in the different designation to describe the region 
and its residents in southwestern Myanmar. While some scholars and authors ad-
dress the region as Arakan state, others call it Rakhine State the same applies for 
Arakanese or Rakhine people. Nevertheless, we agreed to solely make use of the 
term “Rakhine”, which is officially employed by the government. 
Another conflict in our literature becomes apparent when exploring how it names the 
Muslim minority, in this study’s focus, that is mostly resident in Rakhine State, the 
Rohingya. While deciding to follow the terms employed by the Myanmar Government 
in the two cases mentioned above, we chose to do the opposite in this case. The 
reason for this is that the government of Myanmar refuses to call the minority Roh-
ingya and addresses them as Bengali, since they do not recognise Rohingya as an 
ethnicity. However, since the international community accepts and uses the term 
Rohingya, which is also the name that the Muslims themselves prefer, our study will 
only address them as Rohingya. 
 
 
2. Theory and methods in the research 
2.1 Snyder’s Theory 
In this chapter we will provide and discuss reasoning for our hypothesis and choice 
of theory. Furthermore a presentation of the theoretical concepts and how these will 
be applied to our research question and following analysis will be illustrated. 
When working with our hypothesis we have chosen to apply the theory Nationalist 
Elite Persuasion in Democratizing States as presented in the book “From Voting to 
Violence” by Jack Snyder. 
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This theory discusses the effects of transitioning to a democratic system. It argues 
that the previous ruling elite will attempt different manoeuvres of promoting national-
ism in order to maintain as much power from the old system as possible, while on 
the other hand expressing its support for the democratic transition. 
 
2.1.1 Elite persuasion and ethnic nationalism 
Snyder’s theory discusses that in the democratization processes powerful elites, 
transitioning from positions of authoritarian rule to democratic rule, will take ad-
vantage of popular energies to justify tasks of war, economic development and their 
continued influential position within the nation. Elites will attempt to evade a surren-
der of real political authority to the citizens or to new democratic bodies within the 
state (Snyder 2000, 32). 
By working with this principle in correlation with our hypothesis, we will argue that in 
the case of Myanmar, the army has taken a position identical to Snyder’s description 
of persuasive elite. 
The theory argues that ideas of nationalism can become a tool for the elite, when 
attempting to gain popular support within the new political system of democracy. Na-
tionalism can in these instances become an acceptable doctrine for the elite to use 
when trying to remain in power during the democratization process, as it looks to rule 
in the name of the people, though it is not accountable to its people (Snyder, 2000, 
53). 
When looking at our case, the military elite used tools such as implementing Citizen-
ship Laws, which legally declared who was in- and excluded as part of the nation. 
The Citizenship Laws removed the vast part of the Rohingya citizenships and there-
by supported the idea of a Buddhist nation. Thus, the elite expressed favouritism for 
the Buddhist majority in their hatred for the Muslim minority. 
Due to the fact that nationalism is an essential tool for Elite Persuasion in Snyder's 
theory, it is crucial to clarify its definition. Snyder delineates nationalism as: 
 
“(...) the doctrine that a people who see themselves as distinct in their culture, histo-
ry, institutions, or principles should rule themselves in a political system that ex-
presses and protects those distinctive characteristics.” (Snyder 2000, p. 23) 
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Therefore, a nation is characterized as a group of people striving for self-rule and 
identifying themselves with these distinguishable aspects, mentioned above (Snyder 
2000, p. 23). 
 
2.1.1.1  Four types of nationalism 
Elaborating on this definition Snyder presents four types of nationalism that can arise 
within states undergoing democratization. While arguing that one type of nationalism 
is not exclusive to a certain environment, but some prevalence of each can be found 
in certain scenarios. The pervasiveness of this type of nationalism is dependent on 
the strength of the political institutions within the given country (Snyder 2000, 50). 
The first type is civic nationalism, which Snyder argues, is the more inclusive and 
moderate type. Here the elite are not threatened by democratic transitions and well-
functioning representative and journalistic institutions have already been founded 
(Snyder 2000, 70-71). Nonetheless, this more inclusive type of nationalism is not 
suitable for the case of the democratic transition in Myanmar, since this is an ongo-
ing process with its institutions still being weak. 
The three other types - counterrevolutionary, revolutionary and ethnic - are more ex-
clusionary. These frequently occur when the nation in transition is poor and the gen-
eral citizens lack the means to participate democratically in the political life (Snyder 
2000, 70, 75). This is the case of Myanmar. 
Furthermore, Snyder explains that two essential factors are, firstly the powerful 
elite’s ability to adapt to a situation of increasing democracy, and secondly how 
strong the nation’s democratic institutions are at the time when the political participa-
tion starts to grow. It is here distinguished between a nationalism being adaptable or 
unadaptable to the democratization (Snyder 2000, 71-72, 77-79). Snyder identifies 
the two types of nationalism; counterrevolutionary and ethnic to be cases where the 
elite’s interests are unadaptable to democratization. 
Compared to our case, the military as the elite is not adaptable to the democratic 
transition. Our argument for this is supported by the military’s actions that have clear-
ly been hindering the process. These actions include the military drafted constitution 
which reserves parliamentary seats for them and the continuous imprisonment of 
opposing activist (Amnesty Australia, 2015). The former mentioned factors illustrate 
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that though the military regime has initiated democratic transitions, support for a full 
transition to democracy is still not in its interest.  
 
Snyder makes a distinction between whether or not the nation’s political institutions 
are strong or weak in order to establish what kind of nationalism is likely to arise. 
When looking at the two unadaptable variations of nationalism, the counterrevolu-
tionary has strong institutions, while the ethnic nationalism has weak. Myanmar, with 
its institutions lacking popular support and especially the journalistic institution being 
undeveloped and very new, has weak institutions. This is a key factor when charac-
terizing the nationalism in Myanmar as fulfilling the requirements for the ethnic type. 
Thus, we have chosen to apply ethnic nationalism to our study. We have done so 
bearing in mind that some segments of counterrevolutionary nationalism can be ap-
plied to the case of Myanmar as well, since the elite’s interests in this case are una-
daptable to democracy and this type of nationalism emerges when the elite is threat-
ened by democratization. The reasoning behind choosing the ethnic nationalism can 
be divided into two arguments. Firstly, the institutions in Myanmar are weak, and 
secondly, this form of nationalism is centred on national identity, shared culture and 
ethnic attachment, rather than on political loyalty, as is the case of the counterrevolu-
tionary. When focusing on our research question and providing an explanation of 
why the Rohingya have been singled out the ethnic nationalism is more suitable. 
 
 
2.1.1.2 Ethnic nationalism 
The three main reasons, identifying the ethnic nationalism as being the type predom-
inantly present in our case of Myanmar, are firstly the lack of established representa-
tive institutions, political parties and professional journalism. In this institutional 
wasteland our second argument arises consisting of the use of ethnic nationalism as 
a legitimate tool to include or exclude members from the national group.  
This leads to the third reason - the increased likelihood of violent nationalist conflicts 
with the excluded groups within the nation (Snyder 2000, 79). As it will be argued in 
chapter four, the conditions in Myanmar are favourable for ethnic nationalism to 
flourish.   
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2.1.1.3 Logrolling 
Snyder’s describes Logrolling as a phenomenon of “mutual back scratching” that can 
occur in states undergoing democratisation. He argues that when old authoritarian 
ways of ruling breaks up it leaves behind the fragments of the old ruling elite now 
looking for ways to gain power in a new democratic system (Snyder 2000, 66). 
The elite can commit to support nationalist sentiment in order to find a new base of 
support. Snyder argues that in this search for support the elites can aim to support 
nationalist groups in order to gain their backing in the political realm, making the 
elites appear to rule in name of the nation and people (Snyder 2000, 66).  
We will argue with the use of this term that a similar situation can be observed in 
Myanmar, where the remnants of the former Junta can be observed supporting na-
tionalist Buddhist groups. 
 
2.1.1.4 Inaccurate and biased strategic assumption 
This term describes how nationalist groups can build up an image of threat, dispro-
portionate to the actual dangers by set threat. This image can then according to 
Snyder lead to feelings of insecurity and create a perception of a threat that might 
falsely legitimize a militant solution (Snyder 2000, 67). 
We will argue that a similar situation has occurred in Myanmar, where the perception 
of the Rohingya has been built up to them often being declared as a threat to nation-
al security and the Buddhist way of living (BBC 2003, Reuters 2003). We will argue 
that this has legitimized the military’s maintenance of power and influence despite 
the democratic reform. 
 
2.2 Summary 
Snyder argues that before starting the democratization process, a nation needs to 
look at policies regarding its social foundation and take some steps, both in the short 
and in the long run, to establish a solid network of connecting civic institutions. This 
has to be done in order to contain nationalist conflicts. 
In the case of Myanmar these precautions were not taken, which meant that the na-
tion initiated its democratic transition without having created the basic precautions for 
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preventing nationalist conflicts. This was the original reason, the military took over 
power in Myanmar, and has been its argument ever since. 
Another argumentation made by Snyder is that nationalism is the force that fuels the 
belligerence. The theory explains that mass nationalism is rarely growing prior to the 
democratic transition, though the individuals in the country can be aware of the eth-
nic diversity. Thus previously, it has not been an important, political matter due to the 
fact that politics had principally only been seen as an exclusive matter. 
 
2.3 Methods 
This research project examines the process of democratizing Myanmar and why it 
has marginalized the Rohingya minority in the Rakhine State. 
 
By using a deductive-theory testing approach, we adapt Snyder’s theory to our case 
study which will facilitate us to test this theory on our own problem-oriented research 
this in return will give us a clear answer to our research question. Moreover we apply 
the theory to the case of Myanmar to test whether it holds true in this real life transi-
tion.   
 
As the causes and outcomes of the transformation from a military regime to a de-
mocratizing state are difficult to generalize, we found that the quantitative approach 
is insufficient in regards to answering our research question. Therefore, we will chief-
ly utilize a qualitative research strategy to get an understanding of underlying rea-
sons, opinions and motivations. 
The sources that will be used to gain fundamental knowledge and to collect evidence 
about and for the research project are secondary. 
To examine the case-study and establish a foundation for our further analyses, we 
will use focus our research on academic articles, papers, journals and books, which 
have been peer-reviewed and therefore must be considered credible sources. 
Nevertheless, the recentness of the democratic elections in Myanmar demands us to 
draw on non-peer reviewed newspaper articles. However, when collecting articles 
about the mentioned event, we focus on articles from some of the most credible 
newspapers, to remain a general reliability of our sources. By using this broader 
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range of data we are aiming to achieve a more critical and reflective view of the 
case. 
Another factor to consider is that due to the evolvement of the situation in Myanmar, 
some sources might be outdated we have however tried to find sources written with-
in the past 5 years. 
 
When examining the selected data, it becomes clear that we are mostly using 
sources published in and from countries of the Global North, such as UN Human 
Rights Watch book “All we can do is pray” and “Addressing Myanmar's Citizenship 
Crisis” written by Ian Holliday. Thus these sources are influenced by a Western per-
spective. On the other hand even non-western sources, such as the “The Influx Vi-
ruses”, are highly biased and written in favour of the Buddhist people. 
 
In addition to that we have taken into consideration that Myanmar’s borders have 
been closed for a long time during the military regime and until recently information 
coming out of the country has been subject to extensive censorship by the Burmese 
government. This might contribute to the lack of knowledge and research on some 
areas 
 
 
3. Historical Background 
The following chapter will provide an insight to developments of Myanmar’s history 
and the segregation of the Rohingya to establish a fundamental background, which 
we will draw on when examining our research question.  
In order to get an understanding of the foundation of the current transition to democ-
racy and explain its marginalization of the Rohingya minority, it is highly relevant to 
include the country's history of earlier democratization attempts and historical events 
that might have contributed to the ethnic-conflicts and violence which are possibly 
responsible for the general anti-Muslim sentiment. Therefore this chapter provides 
an overview of the history that we have found relevant in our approach to this pro-
ject. This information, we argue, is relevant in order to understand the current situa-
tion in Myanmar and is highly important to produce a solid foundation for analysis. 
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3.1 Decolonization and first attempts of democratization  
It is necessary to examine the history of democracy in Myanmar in order to get an 
understanding of not only the issues plaguing the current effort of democratization, 
but also to understand the origin of the Rohingya identity and it’s following exclusion 
from Burmese society. 
Prior to the independence, very limited democratic practices had been installed by 
the British (Holliday, 2008, 1043). However these measures remained part of British 
rule of then-Burma and therefore not part of the democratization process in Myanmar 
as an independent nation. The first attempt at full Burmese democratization came 
shortly after the Second World War ended. 
The war brought a challenge to the British rule of Burma. A Japanese invasion split 
the country in two and intensified an already existing ethnic divide. The majority 
Burmese population favoured supporting the Japanese, as the British during the co-
lonial rule favoured minority groups, amongst these Muslim minorities, in important 
administrative duties. Especially the armed forces were dominated by minorities 
such as Indians and Karen (Walton, 2008, 894). 
With the end of World War II in 1945 came the emergence of calls for a Burmese 
independence from Britain. A particularly powerful figure in this debate was Aung 
San, who still to this day is considered the father of the independent Burmese state 
(Walton, 2008, 897). Having fought for the British against the Japanese during the 
war, he quickly gained influence in post war Burma and became the leader of the 
Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League (AFPFL), which, following the end of the war, 
were fighting for independence from Britain. Aung San managed to negotiate inde-
pendence for Burma in January 1947. This success was followed up by the 
Panglong conference which saw Aung San gain the support of ethnic minority lead-
ers. Aung San succeeded in winning the elections in April that year and was now 
positioned to become the first democratically elected leader of an independent Bur-
ma (Holliday 2008, 1043; Walton, 2008). Hopes of a united Myanmar under Aung 
San were however short-lived when he and a significant number of his future cabinet 
were assassinated in 1947. The assassination left the political process in tatters and 
led to a large number of insurgencies breaking out across the country. These includ-
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ed uprisings by the Karen, Rakhine and a number of Muslim minorities (Holliday 
2008, 1043)  
The Muslim uprising in Rakhine State fought for secession in order to join the neigh-
bouring Bangladesh, then part of Pakistan and India (Myanmar: The Politics of 
Rakhine State, 2014). This Muslim insurrection saw the rise of the Rohingya as an 
identity different from that of not only the majority Burmese, but also from other Mus-
lim groups (Tomkin, 2014). The insurgencies brought the country on the brink of col-
lapse (Holliday, 2008) and empowered the army as it was seen as the only institution 
with the means to fight the insurrections and bring stability back to the country (Hol-
liday 2008, 1052). 
 
3.2 Myanmar under the rule of a military regime 
During the years of presidential regime, 1947-1962, the military had come to regard 
civilian politicians as corrupt and incapable of not only re-establishing truce between 
the different minority groups, but in general pursuing the national interests (Interna-
tional Crisis Group, 2014, 1). Thus a military coup was staged in 1962, placing U Ne 
Win as the centre of power controlling the three legislative branches (Update Brief-
ing, 2014, 4). The 1947 constitution was nullified and full attention centred on creat-
ing stability in the country by defeating Communist and ethnic-minority rebel groups 
(Update Briefing, 2014, 4). The country was closed off from the outside world as the 
new authoritarian rule promoted an isolation ideology based on what was named the 
Burmese Way to Socialism. A central part of this new strategy included restricting 
free speech in any form and less focus on basic human rights (Update Briefing, 
2014, 4).  
With the country now being a one-party state seeking to defeat ethnic-minority rebels 
and fearful of ethnic autonomy, Muslim communities came under renewed pressure, 
as the government regarded their origins and loyalties as particularly suspect, and 
they were of no electoral value in the new authoritarian context. Hence new and 
stricter segregation laws were implemented in order to ensure suppression of these 
rebellious groups, such as rebellious Muslim group identifying with the Rohingya 
(Myanmar: The Politics of Rakhine State, 2014, 8). These laws were to restrict the 
movement and control their family-planning, for instance by implementing a two-child 
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policy (Lewa, 2015). Furthermore they included significant restrictions ensuring that 
the Rohingya minority faced difficulties in regards to accessing citizenship (Myan-
mar: The Politics of Rakhine State, 2014, 9-11). 
  
With time the public grew weary of the continuous corruption and food shortages that 
Ne Win’s policies had brought about and thus mass protests, led by students and 
joined by monks, filled the streets. In August 1988 these protests were met by mili-
tary forces that cracked down on the protesters and killed several thousands and 
displacing thousands more. These killings and displacements consequently led to Ne 
Win formally resigning as chairman of his party, though he was still very active be-
hind the scenes until a new and even more repressive military Junta staged a new 
coup in September that same year (Myanmar: The Politics of Rakhine State, 2014, 
9; News.bbc.co.uk, 2015).  
In order to comply with the calls for democracy that followed the 1988 uprising, the 
new regime held multiparty elections in 1990. At this election numerous Rohingya 
and opponents of the regime, especially from the NLD, were elected. The results 
were, however, never acknowledged and many of the elected opponents were im-
prisoned, including the democratic hope Suu Kyi. As their electoral voice was nulli-
fied, the Rohingya were politically exposed (Myanmar: The Politics of Rakhine State, 
2014, 9). This exposure was enhanced as the military regime carried out a new citi-
zenship inspection process, which resulting in many Rohingya handing in their na-
tional registration cards in order to gain the new citizenship scrutiny cards.  The ma-
jority of the Rakhine Muslims who surrendered their national registration card were, 
however, never granted with citizenship scrutiny cards and thus they were rendered 
stateless (Myanmar: The Politics of Rakhine State, 2014, 15).                   
  
The 1988 military regime continued the corrupt ways of governing and in 2007 the 
Buddhist monks initiated the Saffron Revolution (Marshall, 2015). The intention of 
this revolution was first to show dissatisfaction with the economic mismanagement 
and the desire to introduce Burma to democracy (Times, 2015). The monk led revo-
lution posed a challenge to the regime, since the participating monks constitute 
some degree of moral authority (Holliday 2008, 1042).  
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3.3 Transition to democracy from 2008 until today 
After several failed attempts to democratize the country, the most successful transi-
tion to democracy, which this study will mainly focus on, was introduced in August 
2003. Together with the military Junta, renamed to State Peace and Development 
Council (SPDC) in 2004 (Holliday, 2008, 1048), Prime Minister Khin Nyunt an-
nounced the seven-point roadmap to democracy, which should lead the country to 
an elected government again (ibid, 1046; Bünte, 2011, 6). To establish this multi-
party government, a significant milestone of this program was the creation of the 
country's new constitution in 2008, which scheduled the first contested elections 
since 1990 for 2010 (Bünte, 2011, 16-17). One of the constitution's main principles 
was to address all citizens equally in regards to their religion and ethnicity and to 
cherish Myanmar’s diversity with its 135 recognized minorities (Holliday, 2013, 407). 
The Rohingya, however, were not included in the government’s list of minorities and 
had not been granted citizenship (ibid). Consequently, the constitution did still not 
address them. 
 
Moreover, the new draft for the constitution also implied that one-fourth of the par-
liament's seats were in incontestable possession of the military and it did not 
acknowledge a potential presidential candidate if he or she was married to a citizen 
from a foreign government or had children with foreign citizenship (Constitution of 
the Republic of the Union of Myanmar (2008), 2008, 20; Council on Foreign Rela-
tions, 2015). Along with the draft of the new constitution, which was officially elected 
as the new legal constitution at the referendum in May 2008, most of the country's 
political prisoners were released (Suaedy and Hafiz, 2015, 36; Cheesman, Farrelly 
and Wilson, 2014, 20). 
Among the latter was the leader of the NLD, Suu Kyi, who had been condemned to 
house arrest since the 1990 elections. Suu Kyi’s release allowed her to resurrect her 
party, which had previously been banned, and participate in the upcoming elections. 
Nevertheless, the new constitution prohibited Suu Kyi from running for presidency, 
due to her affiliation with a foreign country through her marriage (Suaedy and Hafiz, 
2015, 36). This is why the NLD decided to boycott the general elections in 2010 
(Council on Foreign Relations, 2015). 
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The new constitution also incentivised the creation of new political parties, which rep-
resented some of the different ethnical and religious minorities of the country and 
who participated in the elections in 2010. Among these were newly founded Rohing-
ya Parties, whose members had supported the NLD and Suu Kyi in the 1990’s elec-
tions and been known to oppose the military Junta (Suaedy and Hafiz, 2015, 37). 
However, those participating Rohingya parties, who won a small amount of seats in 
the council, got their victory annulled by the military, with the explanation of them 
being Rohingya candidates (Takay, Interview 21/3/14, in Suaedy and Hafiz, 2015, 
37). 
The elections were still considered more inclusive than the one’s in T1990, since 
non-citizens, such as the Rohingya, who were in possession of temporary registra-
tion certificates, were given the right to vote (Crisisgroup.org, 2010, 4). 
The outcome of the 2010 election was a landslide victory for the Union Solidarity and 
Development Party (USDP), who supported the military and its interests (Council on 
Foreign Relations, 2015). This result initiated a presidential change from Than Shwe 
to military experienced and former Prime Minister Thein Sein in 2011, which also 
meant the official disappearance of direct military rule and the beginning of Myanmar 
as a democracy (Cheesman, Farrelly and Wilson, 2014, 22; Council on Foreign Re-
lations, 2015). The constitution’s article guaranteeing 25% of the parliament's seats 
to the military and the fact that both the president with the two vice-presidents and 
the speaker of the lower and upper house of parliament were former military officers 
and generals, uncovered that the military still had a strong and decisive influence in 
the direct rule of the country (Council on Foreign Relations, 2015). 
One of the newly formed government’s first actions guided by the roadmap to de-
mocracy, introduced more democratic reforms, such as easing the censorship of 
print media, establishing the country’s own Human Rights Commission and increas-
ing the freedom of speech by allowing demonstrations and criticism of the govern-
ment (Cheesman, Farrelly and Wilson, 2014, 13 & 20; Crisisgroup.org, 2012, 2-4; 
Council on Foreign Relations, 2015). 
Moreover, after boycotting the 2010 elections, Suu Kyi and the NLD participated in 
the by-elections in 2012, where they secured 43 seats in parliament (Crisisgroup.org, 
2012, 1). 
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The marginalization of the Rohingya and the lack of recognition by the government 
can be examined when looking at the Rakhine State Riots. The year succeeding the 
2012 elections was marked by immense violent ethnic-conflicts between the Muslim 
Rohingya and the Buddhist in Rakhine State, starting in June and reappearing in 
October 2012 until April 2013 (Kipgen, 2013, 234). The riots saw the deaths of hun-
dreds and the displacement of hundreds of thousands (Al Jazeera Investigates - The 
Hidden Genocide, 2013). It also laid waste to significant areas of both Buddhist and 
Muslim areas in Rakhine State (Government of the Republic of the Union of Myan-
mar, 2012a, in Kipgen, 2013, 237). Consequently, hundreds of thousands of people, 
with an overwhelming majority being Rohingya, were forced to leave their homes 
and flee to Bangladesh. Those Rohingya who stayed in their hometown-area, and 
whose homes have been destroyed due to the riots, were resettled into camps and 
fenced-in areas (Kipgen, 2013, 241). In regards to these riots, Human Rights Watch 
published several reports, stating that “targeted killings, rape and mass arrest of the 
Rohingya by Myanmar security forces” (Human Rights Watch, 2012; Kipgen, 2013, 
241), characterized the violence in 2012, which indicates that the Government sup-
ported the Buddhist people. 
Another step towards democracy, but also towards the increasing exclusion of the 
Rohingya from the Burmese society, was the first census after 30 years that took 
place from the 30 March until 10 April 2014. Among the numerous minorities that 
have been counted and recognized as citizens of the country, the Rohingya minority 
were excluded from the process, since the government does not include them in 
their list of the country’s 135 minorities (Suaedy and Hafiz, 2015, 39).  
Nevertheless, the most recent stage of Myanmar’s way to democracy was the first 
contested elections in more than twenty years on the 8 November 2015 (Human 
Rights Watch, 2015). Suu Kyi and the NLD were able to secure a landslide victory, 
as they did in 1990, and are expected to take office (Fisher, 2015). Therefore, the 
future Burmese parliament will be controlled by the former opposition party (ibid, 
2015). Winning 135 seats of 224 seats in the upper house, and 255 of 440 seats in 
the lower House, the NLD will present an obvious majority in the parliament, since 
the incumbent party USDP only won 11 seats in the upper and 30 seats in the lower 
house (ibid, 2015). However, one-fourth of all seats are still reserved for the military 
and thus they maintain a great deal of power (ibid, 2015). 
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Other than in the 2010 elections, the Rohingya were not given the right to vote, as 
their white cards had officially been declared invalid and Muslim candidates were 
excluded in the electoral process (Europarl.europa.eu, 2015; Council on Foreign Re-
lations, 2015). 
 
3.4 Timeline of events: 1941-2015 
1942   Japanese invasion of Burma during the Second World War resulting in 
further divide between ethnic groups 
1945   End of Japanese occupation of Burma 
1947   Burma declared independence from Britain with Aung San becoming  
the country’s first democratically elected president, shortly after he was  
assassinated along with members of his cabinet. 
1948   Internal unrest and rise of session groups fighting for autonomy from 
Burma: Including Karen and Muslim groups. 
1962   Military coup by Ne Win, Military dictatorship is installed. 
1982   Citizenship law: Rohingya are denied citizenship as they are 
classified under the new law as Bengali immigrants. 
1987-1988  Pro-democracy demonstrations breaks out across Burma. New military 
coup in August 1988 with new government promising to restore order 
to the country that embarks on a violent crackdown on protesters. Suu 
Kyi emerges as a political figure in Burmese Politics. 
1990   First democratic election since the military coup of 1962. Suu Kyi and 
the NLD wins a landslide victory, but the Military refuses to recognise 
the result. Suu Kyi is put under house arrest and Military rule persists. 
2003   A 7-step roadmap to democracy is presented by the Burmese military 
government. Aim is to restore Burma as a democratic state. 
2007   Buddhist monks protests against the military Junta, the Saffron 
Revolution, and were violently suppressed. 
2008   A new Constitution was implemented as a milestone of the 7-step  
roadmap to democracy and Suu Kyi is released from house arrest. 
2010   The country's first general multiparty-elections took place, which the 
NLD boycotted. 
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2011   The new government, with new President Thein Sein, took office 
  and Myanmar officially became a democratic state. 
2012   Rakhine State Riots between the Buddhist and Rohingya in June and 
October. 
2014   Myanmar’s first Census after 30 years that excluded the Rohingya as 
citizens. 
2015   The country had its first contested democratic elections for 25 years, 
with the NLD and Suu Kyi winning a landslide victory. 
 
4. Analysis 
The analysis of this project will provide the bearing part of the evidence we have col-
lected and analysed in order to answer our research question and confirm our hy-
pothesis. 
We have divided the chapters into five parts. Each part contains data that has ena-
bled us to work with and test the theory Nationalist Elite Persuasion in Democratizing 
States by Jack Snyder in the case of the Rohingya in Myanmar.   
The five parts of this chapter will present an analysis of the Rohingya identity, the 
opposition against it, an examination of nationalism in Myanmar, its link to the mili-
tary elite of the country and how this link affects the Rohingya in Rakhine State.  
Finally it will provide an analysis of how future development might unfold in the af-
termath of the 2015 elections based on the evidence provided in the analysis. This 
divide of the analysis has been identified to be relevant when working with the 
aforementioned theory by Snyder. Conclusively, an examination of Nationalist Elite 
Persuasion in Democratizing States in the case of Myanmar from 2008-2015 and its 
impact on the Rohingya minority in Rakhine State will be presented. 
 
 
4.1 Rohingya in Rakhine State  
The marginalization of the Muslim Rohingya minority residing in Rakhine State is, in 
an overall perspective, a result of a long and still on-going dispute within the country, 
which discusses their identity and ancestry. 
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This conflict mainly persists in the disagreement between two parties being discord-
ant about whether or not to identify this Muslim minority as Rohingya. The govern-
ment and the bigger part of the Rakhine population are refusing to use the term Roh-
ingya and instead call them Bengali or illegal Bengali (Myanmar: The Politics of 
Rakhine State, 2014, 2). The minority itself insists on their name Rohingya and does 
not accept a term that labels them as being illegal immigrants from Bangladesh (My-
anmar: The Politics of Rakhine State, 2014, 22). One explanation for this rejection is 
the general meaning of the term Rohingya, which translated from the Muslim lan-
guage, spoken by the minority, means Rakhine (Leider, 2014, & 8). Thus, the Roh-
ingya, by naming themselves so, imply that their ancestry is Rakhine and conse-
quently Burmese as well. By calling them Bengali instead Rakhine people, with the 
majority being Buddhist, along with the government present their disagreement with 
this implication and also deny the Rohingya’s Burmese identity. This is why they take 
a clear stand and refer to them as illegal migrants from the Bengal region in Bangla-
desh from which a lot of Rohingya migrated to Rakhine State during colonial times 
(Myanmar: The Politics of Rakhine State, 2014,3). This argument is supported by the 
authors of “The Influx Viruses”, who claim that “there has never been a Rohingya 
race in Myanmar” and all people of Muslim faith migrated illegally into Rakhine State 
(Zan and Chan, 2005).  
However, the Rohingya believe that their ancestors resided in the Rakhine State 
long before the colonial-period (Leider, 2014, 2). Even though the term Rohingya has 
not been historically documented before the independence of Myanmar and only 
emerged as a common term of identification in the 1950s, the government of the 
time frequently made use of the term when referring to Muslim groups residing in 
Rakhine State (Myanmar: The Politics of Rakhine State, 2014, 22). The minority 
identifies itself with this term and prefers to be addressed this way.  
The fact that the government of 1950 used the term and that the official Burma 
Broadcasting Service even introduced a program in the Rohingya language shows 
that the denial of the name was implied later. Most likely around 1982, when the Citi-
zenship Law took effect and the Rohingya were no longer acknowledged as one of 
the country’s indigenous minorities (Suaedy and Hafiz, 2015, 39).  
The Rohingya’s ethnicity has been contested ever since. With Myanmar’s general 
census taking place in 2014, from which the Rohingya were excluded, as the gov-
ernment only allowed to let them be counted as Bengali (ibid, 22; Brooten, 2015, 
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136). This has shown that the government is not only rejecting to identify the Mus-
lims as Rohingya, but also denying the minority’s general ethnicity. 
Therefore, the conflict about this term becomes a more complicated dispute about 
the Rohingya’s’ existence as an ethnicity and leads to the question of whether or not 
there is a Rohingya ethnicity, which in return will give important insight in the reasons 
for their marginalization.  
Following Snyder’s definition of ethnicity, which claims that an ethnic group distin-
guishes themselves on distinctive consciousness that is based on common lan-
guage, culture or common historical experience (Snyder, 2000, 23), this study will 
argue that the Rohingya are an ethnicity. A reason for this is the use of their own 
Rohingya language and that they share the same religion and culture. This culture is 
distinctive from the majority of Buddhist ethnicity in Myanmar.  
We argue, therefore, that the Rohingya are an ethnicity and we will consequently not 
to refer to them as Bengali, which is internationally seen as politically incorrect. Since 
there is evidence of Rohingya residing in Rakhine State before the British Colonisa-
tion in 1824 (Holliday, 2013, 409), we argue further that they are not only an ethnici-
ty, but an indigenous ethnicity. 
The government's motives to refuse the existence of a Rohingya ethnicity seem un-
reasonable, since another Muslim group, the Karen, is an accepted group (Myanmar: 
The Politics of Rakhine State, 2014, 2). This leads to the assumption that a general 
anti-Rohingya sentiment exists among the Buddhist majority in Rakhine State. 
 
4.1.1  Anti-Rohingya sentiment in Rakhine State 
The notion of a widespread Anti-Rohingya sentiment in Rakhine State appears when 
overviewing the minority‘s marginalization. As mentioned above, one of the reasons 
for this is the conflict regarding their ethnicity. However, historical events seem to be 
the underlying cause of their plight and the ethnic tension in Myanmar. 
 
The Rohingya have been marginalised in several ways since the democratization 
process in Myanmar began, but also in earlier times. Important steps to consider of 
this marginalisation, next to the general acceptance of denying their name Rohingya, 
are the official denial of their citizenship in 198 and the exclusion of the country's 
self-proclaimed diversity with 135 acknowledged ethnic groups. Furthermore, the 
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Rakhine State Riots that resulted in the resettlement of hundreds of thousand Roh-
ingya to camps and fenced-areas, which in return restricted their movement, their 
exclusion of Myanmar’s general census in 2014 and last not least the removal of 
their voting right for the elections in November 2015 emphasis their social exclusion. 
The government’s rejection to identify the Rohingya as an indigenous ethnicity surely 
gives an explanation for them trying to exclude the minority from the political sphere 
it does however not adequately explain the overall reasons for this plight of the mi-
nority.  
A better explanation can be given, when examining historical events that created the 
ethnic divide which resulted in an anti-Rohingya sentiment in Rakhine State. In addi-
tion, these events also provide a better understanding of why the majority of Rakhine 
people do not sympathize with the Rohingya and how this explains and legitimizes 
the government’s marginalization of the minority. 
The divide was mostly established during colonial times, with the British Colonialist 
encouraging immigration of workforces from Bengal and India to Rakhine State (My-
anmar: The Politics of Rakhine State, 2014, 3). This intensified even further with the 
Japanese invasion of Rakhine State, because the majority of Rakhine, the Buddhist 
population, supported the Japanese as a result of the British colonial favouring the 
minority groups, including the Rohingya. Which led to the Rohingya supporting the 
British (Myanmar: The Politics of Rakhine State, 2014, 3). This consequently led to a 
general ethnic divide and explains the early roots of the Buddhist population not 
sympathizing with the Muslim minority. 
More recent arguments for the anti-Rohingya sentiment within the Burmese popula-
tion, result from the Rohingya voting against Rakhine parties in the elections of 1990 
and 2010 and instead supporting the incumbent parties who promised them better-
ment of their situation and possible citizenship (ibid, 7). This is why, the Rakhine 
population did not feel supported by their Muslim neighbours and their anger and 
antipathy towards them increased. 
The most recent events in the ethnic-conflict between the Rakhine and the Rohing-
ya, the Rakhine State Riots from 2012, can be seen as a result of a general growing 
fear of the Muslim’s religion. As the publishing of the book “ The Influx Viruses” un-
derlines, that the Buddhist majority in Rakhine State feels threatened by the Muslims’ 
beliefs, since other major Buddhist states, such as India, have been victimized by 
Muslims that tried to wipe-out their belief by massacring Buddhist monks and de-
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stroying important Buddhist structures (Zan and Chan, 2005). Therefore it can be 
assumed that the Buddhist majority in Rakhine State fears that the Rohingya will 
create a Muslim state, which is the underlying reason for restricting their freedom of 
expressing their religion (Al Jazeera Investigates - The Hidden Genocide, 2013). 
Moreover, the Rakhine Buddhists feel threatened by the growing population of Roh-
ingya in their region. They fear that their status as a majority group will shift to them 
becoming a minority in their home region (Myanmar: The Politics of Rakhine State, 
2014, 15). In addition to that, with the democratization process and the opening up of 
the country, another threat becomes visible. Due to the fact that a lot of local busi-
ness in the state are increasingly led by Rohingya ,the Rakhine have concerns about 
losing economic power, with international companies entering the country because 
of the democratization (ibid). 
According to this increasing fear of the Muslim minority and their religion, we argue 
that the reasons for their marginalization uncover a religious aspect of the conflict. 
This fear and antipathy among the Rakhine population is supported by the Burmese 
government. This argument is based on the fact that the state supported the Bud-
dhist Rakhine with security forces during the Rakhine State Riots in the fight against 
the Rohingya (Al Jazeera Investigates - The Hidden Genocide, 2013; All you can do 
is pray 2013), and it expelled the international nongovernmental organization 
Medecins Sans Frontieres from the Rakhine State area, accusing them of favouring 
the Rohingya (Brooten, 2015, 135). Taking in consideration that the minority, which 
has mostly resided in camps since the riots in 2012, was dependant on these ser-
vices, the government removed the sole medical access for hundreds of thousands 
of Rohingya (Brooten, 2015, 135). 
This is why we argue that the anti-Rohingya sentiment, that arose in ethnic conflicts 
between the Rakhine Buddhist population, has an important influence on the gov-
ernment’s action and explains their marginalization. 
Furthermore, this study examines and discusses how the mentioned anti-Rohingya 
sentiment has been used to spread nationalism in the country, especially by extrem-
ist Buddhist movements. 
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4.2 Nationalism in Rakhine State  
According to the hypothesis of this paper, our study argues how nationalism has 
been utilized by influential elite groups to sustain power during the democratization in 
Myanmar, which resulted in marginalization of the Rohingya minority the conditions 
and reasons for nationalism have to be examined. 
In order to apply Snyder’s theory of Nationalist Elite Persuasion in Democratizing 
States to the democratic transformation in Myanmar, it is crucial to scrutinize the na-
tionalistic tendencies of the country beforehand.  
The anti-Rohingya sentiment within the Burmese population is one of the bearing 
reasons for the prospering nationalism. The Buddhist extremist movement called the 
“969-movement” is facilitating the long-existing ethnic conflict between Buddhist and 
Muslims in Rakhine State to spread anti-Muslim hatred throughout Myanmar. Leader 
of this movement is Ashin Wirathu3, who has been imprisoned by the former ruling 
military Junta and released along with the democratization reforms and once even 
called himself “the Burmese bin Laden” (Thomson Reuters, 2013, 1). A major aim of 
the 969 is instigating the Burmese, Buddhist population to boycott Muslim shops and 
is proposing a bill to the parliament, which implies the ban of interreligious marriages 
and prohibits citizens from converting from Buddhism (Thompson, 2013, in Suaedy 
and Hafiz, 2015, 42). Furthermore, the movement, persisting of Buddhist monks 
mainly, has been highly involved in the violent Rakhine State Riots from 2012. While 
this may seem as extremely radical and anti-democratic, especially for a religious 
movement, the 969 enjoys support by important parliamentary members, such as the 
minister for religious affairs and former army lieutenant Sann Sint as well as military 
experienced President Thein Sein (Thomson Reuters, 2013, 2). Even though these 
two influential politicians do not directly declare their support, they claim the 969 
movement to be peaceful and do not see anything wrong in boycotting of Muslim 
businesses (ibid). 
An explanation for this indirect support of the extremists is the earlier mentioned an-
tipathy for Rohingya across the country. The 969 movement is creating nationalistic 
tendencies by creating the picture of a Buddhist enemy, the Muslim, that refers back 
to a long history of ethnic conflicts and anti-Rohingya sentiment and restores the 
                                               
3
 called Wirathu in further study 
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general existing fear among the Buddhist population in Rakhine State towards the 
Rohingya religion.  
With calling the Buddhist to preserve Myanmar from the Muslim religion, the monks 
of 969 established a moral justification for anti-Muslim violence (Brooten, 2015; 
Thomson Reuters, 2013, 2) 
We hereby argue that the 969 movement could only become this successful and 
spread Buddhist nationalism within the country, because of Wirathu’s release from 
prison, a result of one of the democratization reforms from 2011. This leads to the 
broader argument, stating that the democratization process in Myanmar contributed 
to the widespread of nationalistic tendencies.  
 
Applying Snyder’s theory of Nationalist Elite Persuasion in Democratizing States, 
that argues how ethnic nationalism is more likely to emerge in states undergoing 
transformation to democracy, to our study of Myanmar, it becomes clear how the 
conditions in Myanmar are favourable for this type of nationalism to flourish.  
Snyder characterizes ethnic nationalism to emerge more frequently, when the state 
lacks well-established representative institutions, political parties and professional 
journalism (Snyder, 2000). This can be applied to the flourishing of nationalism in 
Myanmar,  considering that extremist movements, like the 969 movement, used un-
professional journalism, such as social-media,  and the country's weak press institu-
tions to spread their anti-Muslim hatred across Rakhine State and all of Myanmar, 
which will be discussed more detailed in the further analysis (ZAW and MCLAUGH-
LIN, 2015). Further on, the institutions of the country are not representative, since 
seats in the parliament are reserved for unelected military members. Thus, the de-
mocratization in Myanmar implied reforms for freedom of speech and expressions, 
which in return allows the 969 movement to spread hatred against the Rohingya 
without being censored.  
This weakness of Myanmar’s institutions leads us to Snyder’s idea that ethnic na-
tionalism in democratizing states will be used as a legitimate tool to include or ex-
clude members from the national group, by basing their collective appeals on com-
mon cultural values (Snyder, 2000). Considering that the 969 movement and their 
involvement in the Rakhine State Riots are actions based on ethnical differences, 
their increasing influence in the government can be seen as using ethnic nationalism 
as a legitimate tool to exclude the Rohingya. Since the main reasons for the current 
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marginalization of the Rohingya are mainly ethnical, such as denying their ethnicity 
and the term “Rohingya”, and refusing them citizenship, the nationalistic tendencies 
behind these steps of marginalization seem highly ethically based. Finally, Snyder 
describes an increased likelihood of violent nationalist conflicts with the excluded 
groups within the nation to be increased during democratization processes (Snyder, 
2000). 
We argue that the reforms to increase freedom of speech and right to demonstrate 
eased in the events from 2012. This, however, does not make any predictions about 
whether or not the military regime would have suppressed the demonstrations and 
riots in Rakhine in a non-violent way, nor does it make judgements on the general 
democratization process in Myanmar.  
 
As the main argument of this research is to prove how highly influential groups, or  
using Snyder’s words - elites, use ethnic nationalism to maintain power during the 
Burmese democratization process, which led to the marginalization The following 
chapter will examine further on the role and influence of the elite within the country. 
 
4.3 Elite Persuasion 
The 1988 protests saw a new military government take power and issue an election. 
The election saw the rise of Suu Kyi when the NLD won the 1990 elections by a sig-
nificant majority of votes. However this was followed by a refusal of the military gov-
ernment to recognise the result of an election it itself issued. These first elections 
and steps towards transition showed that the military would only allow transition on 
its own terms. 
The following years saw repression of opposition parties, including the confinement 
of Suu Kyi to house arrest.  
 
Democratic reform after the 1990 was at a standstill until the introduction of a 7-step 
roadmap to democracy by the Prime Minister and former general Khin Nyunt. The 
roadmap came as a surprise as the preceding years had been marked by complete 
deadlock caused by both repression of political opposition and by a NLD boycott of 
the process due to the military control of the process (Holliday, 2008).  
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In October of 2004 Nyunt was arrested on charges of corruption, but his roadmap for 
democracy persisted, still promising the establishment of democratic processes and 
the drafting of a new constitution (Myanmar Roadmap to Democracy, 2004). 
2007 saw the uprising of the Saffron Revolution, where monks protested against the 
military influence in government and thus initiated the slow process of the democratic 
transition, which was finally promised in 2003. As it has been the case before, the 
protests of 1988, these insurgencies were suppressed again cementing the army’s 
control of the transition (Holliday, 2008). 
The promised constitution was finally drafted in April of 2008 and ratified the follow-
ing month.  
 
 
4.3.1    A Constitution By and For the Military  
The elections of 2015 are seen as the final step of the roadmap to democracy from 
2003. 
However an examination of the constitution and even the roadmap itself highlight a 
transition to a system that entrenches the military as a powerful and influential exec-
utive force in the state of Myanmar. The power in government is by no means a state 
secret as a great deal of its power is directly written and ensured by the constitution. 
In the first chapter of the document some basic principles of Union of the Country of 
Myanmar are presented, including 6 objectives that the Union will aim to pursue. Ob-
jective F clearly defines the role of the military in Myanmar. “(f) Enabling the Defen-
sive Services to be able to participate in the National political leadership role of the 
State” (Constitution of Myanmar, 2008 pp.8). The role of the Army is described with 
greater detail later on and gives a better insight into the consolidation of army power 
in the new democratic system. This is specifically apparent in Article 20 which de-
fines the exact powers of the military as a political force. These powers are present-
ed in three points from a to c: 
 
Point (a) defines the armed forces as the sole patriotic defence force of Myanmar. 
Point (b) states that the Defence Services has the right to independently administer 
and adjudicate all affairs of the armed forces (Myanmar Constitution, 2008 pp.11). 
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This point effectively makes the military independent and not accountable to neither 
legislative nor executive bodies of the state. This point also makes budget discus-
sions a military only affair. This in practice has led to the budget of the military being 
disproportionate to that of other governmental sectors, accounting for 12% of the 
government budget and 4% of the country’s GDP4 in 2013 (worldbank.org, 2015). 
For comparison 0.6% of GDP was spent on education and only 0.5% GDP was 
spent on health in the same year (worldbank.org, 2015). 
Point (c) states, that the Commander-in-Chief of the defence services is the supreme 
commander of all armed forces. This makes the army not accountable to the presi-
dent or prime minister of Myanmar.  
Following the 2015 election which saw opposition party NLD and Suu Kyi win an 
overwhelming victory that saw the party win 77% of all contested seats. Article 20 
will effectively ensure that a transfer of power will only happen on a parliamentary 
level. The army remains independent of external powers such as an opposition dom-
inated parliament, as will be the case when Suu Kyi takes office in 2016. 
Prospects for great change after the 2015 election are therefore doubtful. Even with 
the comprehensive defeat of the military backed USDP party in the election, military 
influence in parliament will in the short range remain the same.  
 
Direct military influence in parliament is defined by article 109 and article 141(b) 
which states that 110 seats in the lower house and 56 seats in the upper house are 
to be seats in permanent military possession (Myanmar Constitution, 2008, 39 & 52).  
This cobbled with a required majority margin of over 75% for constitutional amend-
ments sees that the military effectively have a permanent veto, as they at all times 
control  25% percent of votes. This privilege was exercised as late as the summer of 
2015 when amendments to that exact military veto privilege were rejected by a mi-
nority opposition dominated by the 56 military possessed seats (BBC, 2015). 
 
The 2015 elections landslide victory will see an opposition take power for the first 
time since the introduction of democracy in Myanmar. However, as this chapter has 
highlighted, when Suu Kyi will be taking office through a proxy president in March of 
2016, Suu Kyi and the NLD party will be lacking definitive control of the parliament. 
                                               
4
 GDP: Gross Domestic Product. Is used as a measure value of all goods and services produced in a 
country within a year. 
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4.3.2 The Economic interests of the Military: Jade Mining industry 
While the power and influence of the military in Myanmar is certainly cemented and 
protected by the 2008 constitution, the aspirations and interests, the constitutional 
power aims to protect, run deeper than just aspirations of continued power and influ-
ence. 
A 2015 report released by the NGO Global Witness5 sheds light on an often over-
looked aspect of the democratization process. The report “Jade: Myanmar’s “Big 
State Secret”” (Table 1) highlights the hijacking of a multi-billion dollar industry by the 
military and individuals both directly and indirectly connected to it. 
Myanmar’s jade industry is estimated to produce between 12 and 30 billion dollars’ 
worth of jade per year (globalwitness.org, 2005, 6). An exact number is hard to esti-
mate as none of the involved companies are obligated to release production results 
or income, but if the Global Witness report predictions of 30 billion is correct, that 
number would represent 48% of Myanmar’s total GDP (globalwitness.org, 2015; 
worldbank.org, 2015). This number would then be spread out across a number of 
shadowy companies that are connected to military individuals. 
 
Table 1:  Jade: Myanmar’s “Big State Secret” 
 
                                               
5
 Global witness:Is a NGO that explores, human rights abuses, political corruption, resource exploita-
tion and poverty. 
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Source: Global Witness report: Jade: Myanmar’s “Big State Secret” 2015, 40 
 
Myanmar signed into the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) in 2014 
and is scheduled to release its first report on its extractive industries including jade in 
January of 2016 (Eiti.org, 2015). The contents of this report will shed a clearer light 
on the companies and individuals involved in the Jade-industry.  
The aforementioned aspect of the military, presents a clear economic interest that it 
would likely lose if faced with the prospect of true democratization. This fact is im-
portant when arguing for the use of Snyder’s theory of Nationalist Elite Persuasion in 
Democratizing States. Snyder argues that elites, when faced with prospects of de-
mocratization, will aim to protect assets including those of economic value. When 
combining this with the fact that the constitution gives the military absolute control of 
its own affairs means that the military possess a crony6 industry of which it gains all 
the benefits including that of personal wealth for high ranking officials within its 
ranks. We argue that this is another factor keeping the military elite from embracing 
democratic reform. The benefits both, in terms of power and personal benefit, are 
simply too great to just relinquish. 
 
4.3.3 Nationalism, the Rohingya and the Military Elite  
“(...) the rise of nationalism in states undergoing democratic transition happens when 
an elite group needs to gather support for its policies and actions while still trying to 
avoid surrendering real political power.” (Snyder, 2000)  
 
The preceding chapter has presented some of the military’s interests in Myanmar 
and how these interests are protected through a constitution written by and in the 
interest of the military. The facts presented build a solid foundation for using 
Snyder’s definition of an elite in a state undergoing democratic transition. 
The manoeuvring of the military shows a clear reluctance to relinquish control of 
powers they possessed while governing the country as an authoritarian state, thus 
providing a situation similar to the theoretical described scenario of Elite Persuasion 
in Snyder’s definition of the term. However this still leaves us with the question of 
                                               
6
 Crony; often referred to as Crony Capitalism, is a term that describes business where success, de-
pends on relationships.  
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how this manoeuvring has affected the Rohingya and the rise of nationalism in 
Rakhine State. 
The previous chapter on nationalism has examined the nature of the relationship 
between the military, its supporting party, the USDP, and nationalistic groups such 
as the anti-Muslim 969 movement. 
Snyder presents the phenomenon of “Logrolling nationalist veto groups” as a theory 
of how connections of “mutual back scratching” can be established between elites 
trying to protect their influence and nationalist groups in democratizing states 
(Snyder, 2000, 67). 
This can help in explaining the relationship between movements such as the 969 
movement and the pro-military part of the government, which has seen the USDP 
led government enact several restrictions on Rohingya and Muslims due to direct 
pressure from ethnic nationalist groups. An example of this was in September of 
2015 when nationalist monks of the 969 movement took to the streets to celebrate 
the introduction of laws that would restrict Muslim men from having multiple wives 
and from marrying Buddhist Women (Al Jazeera, 2005. BCC, 2015).  
 
Snyder argues that logrolling emerges when an elite attempts to establish a base of 
support in a new atmosphere of democracy (Snyder 2000, 67). We will use this defi-
nition of the phenomenon to argue that a similar situation has arisen in Myanmar.  
In this case, monks have transitioned from being a vocal opposition to army rule dur-
ing the years of the Junta to now expressing support for the USDP. During the elec-
tions of 2015, USDP saw a significant amount of its support coming from the coun-
try’s monkhood (Reuters, 2015).  
This relationship of mutual support has led to the military dominance in parliament 
being legitimized and accepted by powerful Buddhist national groups as they look for 
support for their anti-Muslim views in government (Snyder 2000, 67). A support that 
has now been granted by the remnants of the elite. 
This relationship between the military elite and anti-Muslim nationalist groups has 
resulted in an environment in which hate speech and ill-informed assumptions have 
become commonplace. Combined with the insecurity and tension these groups cre-
ate, a more positive view of the army has emerged as they are perceived as the only 
entity within the state with the power to suppress unrest and uphold security. To fur-
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ther explore this phenomenon we will consult Snyder’s idea of “Inaccurate and bi-
ased strategic assumption” (Snyder 2000, 67). 
Nationalist groups like the 969 movement drive a disproportionate view of Muslims 
as being a direct threat to national and religious values (Holliday, 2014, 406), which 
has led to numerous violent outbreaks, where security forces needed to intervene. 
These interventions have being accused of favouritism for Buddhist groups (BBC, 
Human Right Watch 2003). We will argue that this favouritism has led to army and 
security apparatus being perceived more positive by Buddhist groups. 
In practice this was observed in 2014 when a survey by International Republican 
Institute, ranked the military in Myanmar as the most trustworthy institution with an 
approval rating of 84% ahead of the government, opposition and media (International 
Republican Institute, 2014, 18). 
This presents an interesting fact, as the exact same institution has previously fol-
lowed policies of severe suppression against its own people, even as late as in 2007 
during the Saffron Revolution. Therefore, a change of public perception of the My-
anmar military institution seems to have occurred. This point can be further explored 
by arguing, that a successful use of elite persuasion has occurred during its democ-
ratization process. The elite in this case have seemingly followed a course through a 
democratization process that has successfully allowed them to sustain immense po-
litical and economic power while managing to introduce and develop democratic pro-
cesses within the country.  
 
4.4 Weak journalistic institutions 
In nascent democracies media tends to play a great role throughout the democrati-
zation process and thus this chapter will focus on the role of the media in the Bur-
mese society.   
Myanmar has experienced prolific change in freedom of press during the last five 
years, since Thein Sein agreed to end decades of censoring media (Haigh, 2015). 
This is illustrated and acknowledged in Freedom House’s new statistics regarding 
freedom of press, which overall shows improvement since 2010. The statistics pro-
vide each country with a numerical score from 0 to 100, with 100 being the least free, 
which divides the countries into groups of free, partly free, not free or the worst of the 
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worst. Myanmar has currently obtained number 73 which, although it is an improve-
ment from 2010, still renders the country as not free (Freedomhouse.org, 2015). Re-
porters without Borders made a somewhat similar statistic placing Myanmar in place 
144 out of 180 ranking in freedom, with 1 being the freest and 180 being the least 
free. This too shows signs of improvement, as the country was placed 174 in 2010 
(Index.rsf.org, 2015). The most noteworthy factors supporting Myanmar’s free press 
have been the allowance of more than two hundred privately owned newspapers to 
print on a weekly basis, removal of censorship in the form of vetting all news stories 
prior to publication and lastly the fact that no journalists were imprisoned from the 
beginning of free press until 2013 (Myanmar shows new signs of press freedom, 
2013). Burmese freedom of press is, however, far from flawless and still essential 
ethical rules have not been laid down, resulting in the freedom only being exercised 
within the borders of the government’s liking. Thus it is difficult to state that the press 
is entirely free although it is much freer than it was prior to 2008, when Thein Sein 
agreed to free the press by including this point in the 2008 constitution (Free-
domhouse.org, 2015). 
This development is not particular and in fact, similar situations can be found in other 
newly democratized countries too. According to Snyder this development is caused 
by biased and capriciously enforced press laws in newly democratizing countries 
(Snyder, 2000, 65). Exactly such press laws exists in Myanmar and have resulted in 
the arrest and imprisonment of four journalists in 2014 (Greenslade, 2015). Their 
crime was, according to President Thein Sein, endangering state security and there-
fore not benefitting the country with their news story, which stated that the govern-
ment was producing chemical weapons (Ibid). Thus, the defining line declaring which 
news stories are within the government's limits is extremely vague. This confirms 
Snyder’s theory, which explains that it is difficult to know the limits when publishing 
critical articles regarding military affairs. Crossing the ambiguous line defined by the 
military, can result in imprisonment as authorities can use the laws against oppo-
nents and thus indirectly force journalists to only meet the criteria of the government 
wishes (Haigh, 2015). 
 
The example of journalists being arrested for performing their job, clearly illustrates 
that Burmese freedom of press is still nowhere near the heights of that in the Global 
North. It is, however, at the stage that can be expected at this point in time as 
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Snyder states. It is consequently not atypical that a great deal of journalists is be-
holden to a particular party or interest group and thus mainly publishes articles for 
their liking (Snyder, 2000, 65). The four journalists’ imprisonment is a perfect exam-
ple of journalists acting against the interests of the government and punished for this 
with imprisonment of up to ten years and shutdown of the newspaper. The example, 
furthermore, serves to illustrate that hostility towards the regime does not only affect 
the journalist, but in many cases the newspaper as well. The newspapers can be 
affected by loss of printing license, which is regularly evaluated and handed out by 
the government, or by shutdown of the newspaper due to the high costs connected 
with trial (Myanmar shows new signs of press freedom, 2013). 
The freedom of press, however, is used for other than news coverage, and especial-
ly Buddhist monks have been diligent to promote their nationalistic attitude through 
news media. The prominent figure in the influential 969 movement and well-
renowned monk, Wirathu, has continuously exercised hatred for and a wish of exclu-
sion of Muslims through profiles on social media and interviews (969 Movement, 
2015; MCLAUGHLIN and ZAW, 2015).  Although the world has looked to this 
movement with fear, Snyder argues that nationalistic appeals, such as the one used 
by the monks, easily arises in nascent democracies and is therefore not outstanding 
(Snyder, 2000, 41). In some cases this will be a result of pressure from the govern-
ment, but in the case of the 969 movement’s hate speech towards the Rohingya, the 
reasoning behind is to be found on a religious level and supposedly in the fear of a 
Muslim takeover (Holliday, 2014, 406). This has created an apartheid-like situation, 
where Buddhists are encouraged to distinguish their businesses from Muslim ones 
by using a 969 sticker and where violence between the groups has been exercised 
frequently during the time of democratization (Marshall, 2015; 969 Movement, 2015). 
This violence has through time killed hundreds and left thousands displaced, such 
ethnic and nationalistic conflict is however one that often arises from infant democra-
cies, Snyder argues, and in this case it must be considered to be true ((Al Jazeera 
Investigates - The Hidden Genocide, 2013; Snyder, 2000, 31).  
Thus the tender freedom of press, constantly influenced by the media suppressive 
government, constitutes that press in Myanmar is still a weak institution. This claim is 
further supported by both Reporters without Borders and Freedom House’s statistics 
placing Myanmar as a country without free press and Reporters without Borders 
even placing the country as the 144 country with least freedom of press out of 180 
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countries in total (Freedomhouse.org, 2015; Index.rsf.org, 2015). Myanmar is there-
fore to be considered as a country with plenty of possibilities for nationalism to flour-
ish, since the institution of media is weak (Snyder 2000, p. 41, 65). Thus the gov-
ernment indirectly holds a stern grip in its people, by constantly influencing their mind 
through the media.  
 
4.5 The 2015 Elections and Future Predictions 
Myanmar experienced its first contested elections in more than twenty years on the 8 
November 2015 (BBC News, 2015). The election intended to mark the final transition 
to democracy and thus the expectations of the outcome were high, especially due to 
the participation of Aung San Suu Kyi. 
The result secured Suu Kyi and the NLD a landslide victory gaining 77 % of all votes 
corresponding to 887 seats out of the entire 1150 contested seats (BBC News, 
2015). On the contrary the military-based USDP won merely 117 seats, correspond-
ing to 10 %, and the military was constitutionally ensured 25 % of the seats and the 
possession of power to elect key ministries (BBC News, 2015). Due to this constitu-
tional paragraph, it has been widely discussed whether the NLD will be able to im-
plement real changes, as the military and military supporting parties still hold much 
power. 
Succeeding the elections Suu Kyi has met with elite members of the military regime 
in order to enter informal settlements, which is supporting the argument that the new-
ly elected government is in need of support from the regime in order to create 
change in Myanmar (Fuller, 2015). Although the population democratically ex-
pressed their wish for change, it remains unclear how much power the military will be 
willing to renounce, resulting in the future of Myanmar continuously being very un-
clear. Thus far the fundamental democratic right of freedom of speech has been 
granted the population, but still journalists and demonstrators are imprisoned for ex-
pressing their beliefs (Haigh, 2015; Haigh, 2015). It consequently seems as though 
the President has had a change of heart in regards to democratizing Myanmar, and 
due to the annulled election results in the contested 1990 elections, anxiety might 
spread. 
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It does however seem highly unlikely that the regime will annul these electoral re-
sults as the military has had long to plan this transition and ensuring constitutionally 
that this transition will not empower them (Holliday, 2008, 1042; Horsey, 2015). 
Moreover this election has been closely followed internationally and the final results 
will be seen as a test of how democratic Myanmar really is (Horsey, 2015). Aware of 
the international attention and pressure the military has publically stated that the re-
sults of the elections will be tolerated (Holmes, 2015).  
Nonetheless numerous uncertainties still seem to be present and thus becoming a 
mature democracy still does not seem to be within reach. This is especially influ-
enced by the fact that Suu Kyi constitutionally is not able to become president. 
Though there is still uncertainty about who will take this position and if her proxy will 
fulfil her commandments (Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar 
(2008), 2008). 
It might seem ironic that the democratically elected Burmese symbol of democracy 
will not be able to take seat as president of Myanmar, but it is all part of the military’s 
well-structured plan of staying in power (Weaver and Phipps, 2015).  
Even so, the majority of the Burmese people continuously hope for democratic 
change in form of a new government. As does the Rohingya minority, in spite of the 
fact that politicians, including Suu Kyi, have been eerily silent in regards to vocalising 
improvement of their poor living conditions. This has been the subject of great inter-
national disappointment and Suu Kyi and the NLD have been widely criticized for not 
speaking of the Rohingya minority. An NLD official has, however, excused the si-
lence by stating that the party has other priorities, like leading to peace, a nonviolent 
transition of power, economic development and constitutional reform (Ramzy, 2015). 
The truth in this explanation should, however, be questioned and the actual explana-
tion is probably the party’s wish to collect votes and keep a friendly political relation-
ship with the monks. The Buddhist extreme nationalist movement will continue to 
closely watch whether the new government makes any effort in repealing laws sup-
ported by the group, among these the enforcement of monogamy, religious conver-
sion and interreligious marriage (Maung, 2015). 
As the Buddhists are the majority in Myanmar, some voters could turn their back on 
the NLD if the party showed support for the minority, whom they perceive as an en-
emy of the state. The recent elections in November were a big step in the direction 
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towards democracy, thus it is arguable that Suu Kyi and the NLD did not want to risk 
anything as there was a lot at stake.  
The current situation does not seem to bring betterment for the Rohingya and the 
Burmese people in general. It is however difficult to predict the outcome of the gov-
ernmental change in March 2016.  
 
 
5. Conclusion 
This study has discussed and scrutinized why the democratization process in My-
anmar has marginalized the Rohingya in Rakhine State, which guided us to a clear 
answer for our research question.  
As already predicted in the hypothesis, the transformation from an authoritarian re-
gime to a democratically elected government, is contributing to nationalistic tenden-
cies, which have been utilized by dominant groups that resulted in the exclusion of 
minorities. By applying Snyder’s theory of Nationalist Elite Persuasion in Democratiz-
ing States, we have found that our hypothesis has been proved. This can be argued 
as Snyder describes an increased likelihood of ethnic conflicts through democratiza-
tion processes, accompanied by the rise of ethnic nationalism. 
Aforementioned concludes that the transition from a military regime to democracy in 
Myanmar has marginalized the Rohingya in Rakhine State through the implementa-
tion of policies that encouraged the social exclusion of the minority. These were legit-
imised through a process of logrolling that allowed ethnic nationalism to flourish in 
order to ensure that the elite of the military maintained power and influence through-
out the process. Additionally this explains the violent ethnic conflicts in Rakhine State 
that caused the displacement and death of numerous Rohingya. 
The common antipathy to the Muslim minority has been facilitated to bring about and 
manifest nationalism during the democratization, for the influential military elite to 
sustain power. After having examined the growing nationalism, we can conclude that 
log-rolling is one of the reasons for its efflorescence. The military has, in order to 
maintain power during the democratization process, both directly and indirectly sup-
ported extremist Buddhist monks, such as the 969 movement that spreads hatred for 
the Rohingya. In return, as the Rohingya’s exclusion from the Burmese society is 
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very important to the extremist monks, they have expressed their support for the mili-
tary. This clearly shows how the monks changed their stance during the democratic 
transition, as they went from protesting openly against the military, to becoming their 
allies. 
The reason why the Rohingya have been marginalized, among the diverse other 
ethnic minorities in the country, is the long existing anti-Rohingya sentiment within 
the country, especially within the Rakhine state. This widespread antipathy for a 
Muslim minority has been facilitated to manifest and create nationalism during the 
democratization, for the influential elite to sustain power. Furthermore, this common 
antipathy has enabled the elite and the 969 movement to create the notion that Roh-
ingya are a threat to the Buddhist way of living 
With the military being able to ensure their  power constitutionally, it was the initiating 
force of Myanmar’s democratization, while on the other hand it still has a clear inter-
est in hindering the transition to a full democracy. Thus, this legitimized influence of 
the military elite questions whether the transition to a democracy is real or just a 
cover up process to maintain the military's power. The elections of 2015 with Aung 
San Suu Kyi, the country’s symbol for democracy, and her party securing a landslide 
victory, the political system in Myanmar may establish more democratic institutions 
that could lead to the change of the constitution. Nonetheless, Suu Kyi has already 
held different meetings with members of the military elite, thus we predict that the 
military will not lose its influence and the country’s ‘disciplined democracy’ will be 
maintained. If this prediction proves correct, it would concurrently mean no better-
ment for the marginalization of the Rohingya and thus no improvement of their situa-
tion in the near future. 
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Appendix: 
 
 
Abstract 
This research project will provide an insight into the process of democratization in the Re-
public of the Union of Myanmar in Southeast Asia.  
It will examine the case of what the UN calls the most persecuted minority, the Rohingya, 
and how this plight has links to the processes of democratization in the country.  
The theory of Nationalist Elite Persuasion in Democratizing State by Jack Snyder will be 
applied in order to explain the actions and interests of groups in states undergoing democra-
tization, and provide a framework for understanding why minority exclusion can occur in 
young democracies.  
By applying the theory to this case of the Rohingya in Rakhine State, extensive links were 
found between the process of democratization and ethnic exclusion in Myanmar.  
It was found that an army elite, previously connected to the former Junta of the country have 
managed to transfer its pre-democracy executive power into the new democratic system of 
Myanmar. In correlation with Snyder’s theory this was done, by stirring up national and reli-
gious sentiment among nationalist groups who have the exclusion of the Rohingya as one of 
their main goals. This in turn leads to the minority’s increased marginalization despite the 
introduction of democratic processes.  
Finally, the paper will provide a prediction of what the future holds for Myanmar as the coun-
try recently completed a historic election in November of 2015, the results of which will see 
the first opposition led government take power in the democratizing state. 
 
 
 
 
Study Portfolio 
The academic content in your project work: 
- How is the theme of your house reflected in your project? 
The house theme for this semester is Media. Our project, with its focus on the effects 
of the democratization process on the Rohingya minority in Myanmar, does not in-
tentionally address this theme. However, the application of Snyder’s theory to our 
study enabled us to include the importance of journalistic institutions. This is why you 
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can say, that the house theme is involved in one part of the argument for our re-
search question. 
 
- What have you done to meet the study regulation's requirements to the 
project? 
In order to meet the study regulation’s requirements we firstly choose a topic of so-
cial scientific relevance and worked problem oriented in order to answer our re-
search question and problem formulation. We also made sure that the selected topic 
is of social scientific relevance. In answering this question we have applied method-
ology to have a reasonable structure. Moreover we chose peer-reviewed, academic 
literature that must be concluded as relevant for the selected case and drawn on this 
in order when seeking to answer our research question. This selection of sources 
provided evidence to support our problem, keeping the limitations of our study and 
sources in mind. 
Throught writing this project we have evaluated the work process and stated this 
process clearly in this study portfolio. 
 
- Which experiences will you bring along to meet the academic require-
ments in your next semester's project? 
Most of our group members were not really investigating on research ideas that 
could cover this year’s house theme and we all got inspired by this particular idea of 
topic, even though it not really address the house theme. To be able to include the 
house theme better next time, we will prepare more ideas about what kind of project 
we would like to do, by considering to involve the house theme in it.  
 
The group as an organisational unit: 
- How have you organised your project work? 
Throughout the process of writing the project we have put great emphasis on sharing 
the workload as equally as possible and the reviewing the finished parts of text to-
gether as a group during our weekly meetings. We have done this to ensure that we 
all gain the knowledge of the particular paragraph and simultaneously strengthening 
the weaknesses of one another. Thus we have also ensured that we all share re-
sponsibility for what has been produced and that we all participate equally. Succeed-
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ing the formation of our group we discussed our strengths and weaknesses in order 
to know where to support each other and divide the workload as cleverly as possible.  
 
- How have you evaluated your work process as your project has pro-
ceeded? 
We’ve started each meeting with a five minutes discussion about difficulties which 
we might have faced while doing homework for the project and through this discus-
sion tried to come up with solutions and improvements.  
Furthermore we have ended each meeting by focusing on evaluating the progress 
made that day and what we should focus on doing better for next meeting.  
By constantly ensuring that every obstacle or general dissatisfaction was voiced we 
have avoided serious group disputes and ensured that we as a unit have had more 
or less the same idea of what the project was evolving to.  
This is definitely a tactic that would prove itself useful during next semester too, as it 
creates a safe environment for debate and ensures that everyone has the opportuni-
ty to state if something project related is bothering them.  
 
 
- What will you as an organizational unit do differently for your next se-
mester's project? 
One thing we have learned this semester is to start discussing in which direction the 
project shall develop and to open this discussion as soon as possible. Furthermore 
we have found that we all work differently and that it is crucial to take this into ac-
count to ensure that the working environment is inspirational to every single group 
member and that no one gets stressed out. Finally we have found that notes for all 
red sources will prove useful in the process of writing the actual project.  
 
- Which experiences will you bring along to succeed as an organization-
al unit in your next semester's project? 
As aforementioned we will with us the five minutes discussion in the beginning of 
each meeting and definitely make notes for all sources - to ensure that the work of 
reading these is not wasted.  
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- How have you distributed the responsibility between you?  
Although we have sought to distribute the workload thematically and equally be-
tween us, we have put great emphasis on the fact that we should all share responsi-
bility for every part written and for the process behind it. Thus no one was forced to 
take responsibility for writing greater parts of the assignment. We have furthermore 
ensured that we always had clear outlines for each chapter that needed to be pro-
duced and hereby ensuring that we all had a saying in what the different chapters 
contain.  
  
 
The group as a production unit:  
 
- What must be in place in order for you as group to produce at your 
best? 
In order to produce the best we can, we must all have understood what the specific 
task is and how we divide the work. When we have come to a specific thing that we 
have not understood, we have been seeking help mainly from each other, our super-
visor or from other groups. 
 
- Which conditions have been important in order for you as a group to 
work towards submission of the 'product' as a common goal? 
Both the group dynamics and the deadlines made by our supervisor have been very 
helpful in order to fulfill the task. 
  
- Which experiences will you bring along to succeed as a production 
unit in your next semester's project? 
Our group has been really happy about the deadlines that our supervisor gave us. In 
the end we noticed that we had been doing so much work already by handing in the 
tasks that he had given to us. Thus, we will definitely bring that to our next project 
work. If our next supervisor is not giving us deadlines, we will have to agree on some 
in the group. 
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- What will you as a production unit do differently in your next 
semester's project? 
Everything has gone well so far, so we are not really sure on what to change. Maybe 
we will be more sure when we have been through the whole writing process by the 
time of hand-in. 
 
- How have you had the production of your project to proceed? 
Our supervisor scheduled semi-monthly meetings for which we had to hand in drafts 
of different parts of the project, thus we were forced to consider and discuss how we 
would produce different parts of the project. Moreover this has resulted in us having 
initiating drafts ready as we started producing the concluding project in the intensive 
period. As this period began we have met almost daily to discuss and write separate-
ly but with clear and thoroughly discussed outlines.  
 
- How have you made use of each other's resources best possible?  
Seeking to incorporate our different strengths into the project we have ensured that 
each of us has written parts of the project alone and then we have all edited and 
made comments for this together. We have hereby sought to ensure that our differ-
ent writing styles and strengths within writing has been incorporated into every part if 
the project. Moreover we have discussed the contents of every chapter and sub-
chapter before distributing the workload.  
 
 
The group as working environment: 
 
- What has characterised the working environment in your group? 
The working environment in our group is generally characterised by a very respectful 
and polite way of working together. Discussion are mostly held on a non-emotional 
level so no one feels personally offended and we always encourage every group 
member to participate in discussion to hear everyone’s opinion and consider new 
ideas and viewpoints. We created a working environment where no one should be 
afraid to speak their mind or asks questions when he or she is confused, because all 
opinions, questions and ideas are relevant and important to acknowledge.  
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- What have you been doing in order to create room for all group mem-
bers in the way you work? 
The research and work we have done so far was mostly divided equally among all 
group members so on the one hand  no one would be left out and on the other hand 
we would not have the role of a typical “leader” who is doing most of the work and is 
dominating in group discussions as well. By planning time in the beginning and end 
of each meeting for all group members to tell the rest of the group whether or not 
have had problems with the homework, the working atmosphere, etc., problems can 
be heard and tried to be solved. Moreover, by doing so each member gets its space 
in each meeting to clarify some troubles and improve the whole working environ-
ment. 
 
- How can you as a group best possible promote the working environ-
ment for all group members? 
We can promote the working environment best by what we are already doing, which 
is giving each member the possibility in every single  group meeting to tell their con-
cerns and problems about the project. Additionally, by encouraging each other's 
opinions and ideas instead of mostly criticizing them, we can motivate all members in 
the research process.  
 
- How have you as group evaluated the working environment in your 
group? 
The working environment in our group is satisfying all group members. We created a 
really calm and productive way of working together, but also a space where we get 
to know each other better, which in return improves the working environment, be-
cause we hesitate less to criticize or encourage each other when knowing everyone 
on a personal level. Our discussion could be more powerful sometimes, but we are 
all optimistic that this will automatically happen in the final phase of the project.  
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- Which experiences will you bring along to create the best possible 
working environment in your next semester's project? 
A technique that worked well for us was to implement a five minutes discussion of 
homework and the group situation. This technique enabled us to make sure that the 
working environment was always good and safe for everyone. It has been our belief 
that a safe working environment is vital for the produced project, thus we held these 
five minutes meetings. Moreover we focused on using our time productively but at 
the same time making room for having fun together. We focused on this to make 
sure that friendly relations was build between all group members, which made it eas-
ier to critique and improve the text bits that we wrote individually. This off cause is a 
plan we agreed on from the beginning of the project and thus one could say that we 
are generally fond of matching expectations in the beginning of this process.  
 
 
- What will you do differently regarding the working environment in your 
next group semester's project?  
When writing the next project we will be more clean on when it is breaktime and 
when it is time to work. We have found that our lines have been too vague some-
times ad thus it has been hard to distinguish between when we should do what. This 
has created a little tension in the group at times and is therefore something we’ll 
bring with us and seek to avoid next time.  
 
